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n normal times, investors buy and sell 
financial assets because there are gains 
from trade. However, markets do not always 
function properly — they sometimes “freeze.” 
An example is the collapse of trading in mortgage-
backed securities during the recent financial crisis. Why 
does trade break down despite the potential gains from 
trade? Can the government intervene to restore the 
normal functioning of markets? In this article, Yaron 
Leitner explains what a market freeze is and some of the 
theories as to why these freezes occur. 
A puzzling feature of the recent 
financial crisis is the collapse of trad-
ing volume and the lack of transac-
tions in many financial markets that 
were historically quite liquid. This is 
strange because we expect demand 
and supply forces to generate a price at 
which trade will occur. However, like 
everything else in life, markets are not 
perfect, and they may not always func-
tion properly. Why do markets seize 
up, even when there are potential gains 
from trade?  Can the government in-
tervene to restore the normal function-
ing of markets? We begin by explaining 
what we mean by a market freeze.
WHAT IS A MARKET FREEZE?
In normal times, investors buy and 
sell financial assets for various reasons. 
First, they may have different opinions 
as to what assets are worth. Those who 
think an asset is worth more than its 
current price will buy, and those who 
think the asset is worth less will sell. 
Second, investors may have different 
needs. For example, one investor is 
about to retire and would like to hold 
relatively safe assets; another investor 
is young and may prefer to hold risky 
assets, taking the chance of getting 
a higher return. The first investor 
can reduce the risk in his portfolio by 
selling shares of stocks he owns to the 
second investor. Another example is 
the sale of mortgage-backed securities: 
A bank originates a mortgage and then 
sells it to other investors. In this way, 
the bank replenishes its funds and can 
use the sale’s proceeds to originate 
another loan.
One way to think of the examples 
above is to say that each investor at-
taches a different “value” to the asset, 
where this value incorporates his own 
assessment about the asset’s cash flows 
(for example, stock dividends) as well 
as his own preferences (for example, 
attitude toward risk). If one investor 
attaches a high value and another 
investor attaches a low value, there 
are potential gains from trade. As long 
as trade takes place at a price that is 
between the two values, both inves-
tors are better off. If there are many 
buyers and sellers, trade will take place 
until the market “clears.” The market-
clearing price is the price at which 
demand equals supply. That is, no one 
wants to sell below the price, and no 
one wants to buy above the price. In 
normal times, market-clearing prices 
represent “fair values,” which reflect 
expected cash flows and individuals’ 
attitudes toward risk. You can think 
of fair values as the price that would 
be agreed on between a willing buyer 
and a willing seller, with neither be-
ing required to act, and both having 
reasonable knowledge of the relevant 
facts.1 
A market freeze refers to a situation 
in which trade does not occur despite 
1 This is the IRS definition (Publication 561). 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) defines fair value as the “price that 
would be received to sell an asset or paid to 
transfer a liability in an orderly transaction be-
tween market participants at the measurement 
date.” FASB then explains each term in the 
definition above in more detail. (See Statement 
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, 
September 2006.)  the potential gains from trade. An 
example is the collapse of trading in 
mortgage-backed securities during the 
recent financial crisis. (See the figure.)
One of the challenges during 
a market freeze is the lack of mar-
ket prices from which we can infer 
fair values. While in practice some 
transactions may occur, these trans-
action prices may not represent fair 
values because only a limited number 
of transactions take place and/or some 
investors trade only because they must. 
For example, to avoid bankruptcy, a 
firm might be forced to sell its assets 
at a very low price, one that does not 
represent the fair value. While a lack 
of market prices is a symptom of one 
problem, it can also cause additional 
problems, since potential buyers may 
not know how much to bid for the 
assets. For example, when you buy a 
house, you look at the prices at which 
similar houses in the area were sold. 
However, if no houses were sold re-
cently, it may be hard to come up with 
a price.2 The lack of market prices also 
led BNP Paribas, France’s largest bank, 
to halt withdrawals from three of its 
investment funds in 2007. In a state-
ment, BNP Paribas said that “the com-
plete evaporation of liquidity in certain 
market segments of the U.S. securitiza-
tion market has made it impossible to 
value certain assets fairly regardless of 
their quality of credit rating.” Alain 
Papiasse, head of BNP Paribas’s asset 
management and services division, 
said in an interview, “For some of the 
securities there are just no prices…As 
there are no prices, we can’t calculate 
the value of the funds.”3
In practice, it is hard to tell 
precisely whether gains from trade 
exist because we do not observe 
investors’ needs and we do not know 
the valuations they have in mind. 
Thus, a simple explanation for the lack 
of trade might be that investors do not 
trade because they do not need to; for 
example, they have exhausted all the 
gains from trade and have reached the 
desired outcome.  While possible in 
theory, it is difficult to imagine that 
changes in preferences or portfolio 
objectives could explain the dramatic 
collapse in trading we observe in the 
figure. 
Another simple explanation for 
a market freeze is that assets have 
become more risky, so investors are 
reluctant to hold them. However, 
there is no simple relationship between 
changes in asset risk and the volume 
of trading.  Increased risk may actually 
result in more trade, since those who 
already hold the assets may rush to sell 
them. And if the price is low enough, 
other investors may be willing to 
buy, as in our example in which the 
investor who wants a safe portfolio 
sells shares of stock to the investor 
who wants to take more risk. Thus, 
when assets become more risky, we 
may see a market crash in which prices 
drop significantly but not necessarily a 
market freeze. 
Other explanations involve a more 
puzzling situation in which investors 
do not trade even though it may seem 
that trade can make them better off. In 
particular, we explain why Investor A, 
who owns an asset, may not sell it to 
Investor B, even though both investors 
know that Investor B attaches a higher 
value to the asset.4 
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2 William Lang and Leonard Nakamura provide 
a formal model for this. They show that a lack 
(or a low amount) of recent home sales re-
duces the precision of appraisals. This, in turn, 
forces lenders to require larger down payments, 
thereby affecting current sales.
3 See the article, “BNP Paribas Freezes Funds as 
Loan Losses Roil Markets,” Bloomberg, August 
9, 2007.
4 In a related Business Review article, Ronel Elul 
discusses some other features of a liquidity cri-
sis, such as a large decline in prices, a flight to 
quality, and a liquidity spiral, wherein an initial 
drop in prices propagates to a large decline.
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INVESTORS MAY NOT KNOW 
HOW TO QUANTIFY RISK
Introductory finance classes 
usually teach students how to calculate 
present values, that is, how to answer 
the question, “How much is an asset 
worth?” An important ingredient 
in this process is an estimate of the 
asset’s expected cash flows. Another 
important ingredient is the asset’s risk 
or, in other words, how likely you are 
to obtain each potential outcome. 
Financial companies use various 
models to quantify assets’ risk. In 
normal times, these models seemed 
to have worked pretty well. However, 
when house prices started falling, 
and homeowners defaulted on their 
mortgages, investors realized that 
the models did not work; that is, the 
assumptions behind the models were 
incorrect. Investors knew that there 
was risk, but they did not know how to 
quantify it.
What should investors do in this 
case? One response might be to avoid 
buying the asset and try to sell it if you 
already own it. As mentioned earlier, 
in this case, the outcome could be a 
huge volume of sell orders and a price 
collapse, but not a market freeze.
Another response, discussed in a 
paper by David Easley and Maureen 
O’Hara, is to stay with the status quo, 
that is, do nothing. This response leads 
to a market freeze. Investors avoid 
buying because they do not want to 
pay too much, and those who already 
own the asset avoid selling because 
they do not want to sell at too low a 
price. For example, suppose you own 
an asset and someone offers to buy it 
for $50. You may think this price is 
too low because the asset might be 
worth $70. Now suppose someone 
offers to sell you additional units of 
the asset at $50 per unit. (So then 
you would have the units you already 
own plus additional ones.) If you are 
sure that the assets are worth $70, 
buying additional units at $50 would 
be a good thing. However, if you are 
afraid that the price might fall to $30, 
you will not buy additional units at 
$50. Thus, you may simply sit on the 
fence and do nothing. If everyone else 
behaves like you, the market freezes.
The underlying assumption is 
that if an investor thinks there is more 
than one plausible way to value the 
asset, he trades only if he is better 
off given every plausible scenario.5 In 
the example above, you (the investor) 
thought it was plausible that the asset 
might be worth $70, but it was also 
plausible that it could be worth only 
$30. If you had bought the asset at $50, 
you would be better off if the asset is 
actually worth $70, but worse off if 
the asset is worth only $30. If, instead, 
you sold the asset at $50, you would 
be better off if it is worth only $30, 
but worse off if the asset is worth $70. 
Therefore, you did nothing.6
Quoted Prices May Be Biased 
Relative to Fair Values.  Easley and 
O’Hara’s model has some interesting 
implications for the debate on how to 
establish fair values when markets are 
frozen. For example, FASB suggests 
using quoted prices.7 In normal times, 
quoted prices reflect fair values, since 
transactions occur at or close to these 
prices, and it doesn’t really matter if we 
use bid or ask prices, since for highly 
liquid assets the two prices are roughly 
the same.8 
Suppose now that the markets 
are frozen. Easley and O’Hara show 
that while investors may continue to 
quote bid and ask prices, these prices 
may be biased relative to fair values, 
since no trades occur at these prices. 
Consider, for example, the bid price. 
You might guess that the fair value is 
above the bid price because investors 
who do not know how to quantify 
the risk may play it safe by offering to 
buy at a low price. While this may be 
true in some cases, Easley and O’Hara 
obtain the surprising result that, in 
other cases, the fair value may actually 
be below the bid price. The intuition 
is that the bid price reflects the beliefs 
of only one investor — the one who 
is the most optimistic; however, fair 
values should reflect the beliefs of all 
investors, including those who are very 
pessimistic and bid very low prices. 
Similarly, Easley and O’Hara show that 
the ask price may overestimate the fair 
value, but it may also underestimate it. 
Easley and O’Hara suggest that using 
the average of the bid and ask spread 
might be better than using just one of 
these two quotes. However, they also 
point out that this measure may be 
biased relative to the fair value; it may 
overestimate the fair value, but it may 
underestimate it.9
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Another explanation suggested 
by economists for the recent market 
freeze is an increase in asymmetric 
information, that is, a situation in 
which some investors have better 
5 Different investors may have different sce-
narios in mind, depending on whether they are 
optimistic or pessimistic.
6 Economists have used the words “uncertainty 
aversion” and “inertia” to describe the behavior 
of the investor above. Uncertainty aversion 
means that investors behave as if the worst-case 
scenario will happen. This type of behavior 
and its implications for a liquidity crisis are 
discussed in Ronel Elul’s Business Review article. 
Inertia means that investors act (buy or sell) 
only if they expect to be happy with their 
decision, given any plausible model for valuing 
the assets. If they can come up with even one 
plausible model under which they expect to lose 
money, they do nothing.
7 See Statement of Financial Accounting Stan-
dards No. 157.
8 The bid price is the highest price someone is 
willing to pay for an asset. The ask price is the 
lowest price a seller will accept when selling the 
asset. Business Review  Q2  2011   15 www.philadelphiafed.org
information than other investors. For 
example, the seller of a used car may 
know whether the car is a lemon, but 
the buyer would have no knowledge 
of that. This is different from the 
situation in the previous section in 
which two investors had different 
opinions as to what the true value 
was, but none of them had better 
information than the other.10,11
In a well-known article, George 
Akerlof, who won a Nobel Prize in 
economics in 2001, has shown that 
an information asymmetry, such as 
that in the example above, can lead 
to a market breakdown. The idea is 
this: If you think someone has more 
information than you do, you will be 
afraid to trade with him for fear of 
being exploited.
The following example illustrates 
this. Bank A (the seller) originates a 
loan, which it wants to sell to Bank 
B (the buyer). The value of the loan 
depends on the borrower’s likelihood of 
default; the value is $60 to Bank A and 
$80 to Bank B. Both banks know that 
Bank B has a higher valuation because 
it can do a better job of monitoring 
the borrower and collecting the loan. 
Everyone is better off if Bank A sells 
the loan to Bank B. Any price between 
$60 and $80 could work.
The sale above may not go 
through, however. The problem is that 
since Bank A originated the loan, 
it has a better idea of whether the 
borrower is likely to default. That is, 
Bank A has more information than 
Bank B. For example, suppose Bank 
A knows that the loan is worth $60 to 
itself and $80 to Bank B. In contrast, 
Bank B knows only that it values the 
loan at $20 more than Bank A, and 
that the value of the loan to Bank A is 
somewhere between $0 and $100, with 
each value equally likely. Then Bank 
A will not sell the loan to Bank B, 
despite the fact that both banks know 
that the loan is more valuable to Bank 
B than to Bank A.
Why won’t the sale go through? 
Whenever Bank A agrees to sell, Bank 
B can conclude that Bank A values 
the loan at the sale price or less. For 
example, if Bank A agrees to sell at 
$60, Bank B can conclude that the 
value of the loan to Bank A is between 
$0 and $60. Since Bank B values the 
loan at $20 more than Bank A, this 
means that the value of the loan to 
Bank B is between $20 and $80, or 
$50, on average. Thus, if Bank B buys 
the loan at $60, it expects to lose 
money, on average. If Bank B offered 
a higher price, it would expect to lose 
even more. However, since Bank A 
knows that its own valuation of the 
loan is $60, it will agree to sell only if 
the price is at least $60.
CAPITAL CONSTRAINTS
The effects of asymmetric infor-
mation are magnified when the seller 
has large inventories of assets but can 
sell only a fraction of them. In particu-
lar, regulators may use the new sale 
price to reassess the value of the seller’s 
remaining assets. If the value drops, 
regulators may require more capital, or 
even worse, if the seller is a bank, the 
regulator may shut it down. Potential 
lenders may also use market prices to 
decide how much to lend and whether 
to roll over loans, even if regulators 
don’t require banks to use mark-to-
market accounting.12 Whether the 
constraints are imposed by a regula-
tor or by market participants, we can 
simply say that the seller is subject to 
9 The discussion above explains why we may 
observe large bid and ask spreads during a 
financial crisis. A small bid and ask spread 
exists during normal times, even if markets 
are competitive. The small spread reflects the 
risk of trading with investors who have better 
information or the risk that the value of dealers’ 
inventories (that is, the units of assets they may 
need to hold temporarily when buying and sell-
ing) will fall. I discussed these two components 
of the spread in more detail in an earlier Busi-
ness Review article. During a financial crisis, a 
spread exists not only for the two reasons above 
but also because investors do not know how to 
value the assets.
10 Many market observers emphasized the prob-
lems of asymmetric information in the markets 
for mortgage-backed securities during the 
financial crisis. For example, the original TARP 
proposed that the Treasury Department pur-
chase mortgage-backed securities from banks in 
an auction. Commenting on this plan, finance 
professors Glenn Hubbard, Hal Scott, and Luigi 
Zingales note that “such an approach raises sig-
nificant problems – most significant is the risk 
posed by asymmetric information regarding the 
value of these securities. Because the holders 
of complex and incomparable mortgage-related 
securities have more information regarding their 
worth than does Treasury, Treasury is at a huge 
disadvantage and will likely overpay.” See the 
article, “From Awful to Merely Bad: Reviewing 
the Bank Rescue Options,” Wall Street Journal, 
February 7, 2009.
11 Why would asymmetric information increase 
suddenly? Gary Gorton has suggested that 
initially investors thought that mortgage-backed 
securities were “safe,” so the fact that the seller 
might have had more information was not an 
issue. However, when indexes of subprime risk 
began to fall, investors realized that mortgage-
backed securities were not safe; that is, investors 
realized that some market participants were 
willing to pay a premium to protect themselves 
against subprime loan default. At this point, the 
fact that the seller may know more about the 
likelihood of default became an issue. 
                                          
                                               
                                               
12 Under mark-to-market accounting, assets 
are valued based on the recent market price of 
identical or similar assets. For example, if you 
bought a share of stock for $50 and the stock 
now trades for $20, the “mark-to-market” value 
of your stock is only $20, even though the “book 
value” is $50.16   Q2  2011 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
capital constraints, meaning that the 
seller must ensure that the market 
value of his inventories is high enough 
relative to the value of his liabilities. 
The cost of violating the constraint is 
assumed to be very high. 
Depending on Leverage, We 
May Observe Increased Trade or a 
Market Freeze. Concerns about the 
market value of his remaining assets 
may induce the seller to reject offers 
that he would accept if he were not 
subject to a capital constraint. Thus, 
we may observe less trade compared 
with the situation in which the only 
problem was asymmetric informa-
tion. However, in some cases, we may 
actually see more trade. The reason is 
that the buyer may understand that a 
profitable trade would be scuttled by 
the seller’s capital constraint and may 
offer to buy the asset at a higher price. 
Since a higher price increases the 
chances that the seller will accept the 
offer, trade is more likely to happen.
In a recent working paper, Philip 
Bond and I show that whether we see 
more trade or less trade depends on 
the seller’s “leverage,” meaning that 
it depends on the size of his liabilities 
relative to the market value of his as-
sets or, alternatively, on how tight his 
capital constraint is. When leverage 
is low, inventories have no effect on 
trade. When leverage is moderate, 
inventories increase the likelihood of 
trade. Finally, when leverage is high, 
the market freezes. We also show that 
a market freeze may be preceded by 
increased trade and an increase in le-
verage. This pattern is consistent with 
what we have seen in the recent crisis.
The reason is as follows: If the 
seller has only moderate leverage, the 
buyer can ensure that the seller’s capi-
tal constraint is satisfied by increasing 
the bid. This reduces the buyer’s ex-
pected profits from the transaction but 
still allows him to profit, on average. 
However, if the seller’s leverage is too 
high, such that the value of his assets 
is just a little bit above the value of his 
liabilities, the buyer must increase the 
bid by a lot to ensure that the seller’s 
capital constraint remains satisfied 
after the transaction. However, with 
such a high price, the buyer expects to 
lose money and may prefer not to bid 
at all.
The reasoning above also explains 
why we may see increased trade before 
the market freezes. Like the seller, the 
buyer may also have inventoried as-
sets, and the buyer may be concerned 
about their market value. Under 
some circumstances, when the buyer 
purchases new assets, the market value 
of his existing assets falls.13 In turn, he 
becomes more leveraged and his capi-
tal constraint tightens. This forces him 
to bid a higher price in the next trade, 
which increases the chances that the 
next seller will accept the offer — so 
we may see more trade. However, at 
some point, when the buyer continues 
to accumulate assets, he becomes over-
leveraged and he can no longer bid for 
the asset because whatever he does, he 
will either expect to lose money or he 
will violate his capital constraint. This 
is when the market freezes.14
Policy Implications. Our model 
suggests a caveat to proposals that 
would require sellers of asset-backed 
securities to retain a stake on their 
own books. In particular, regulatory 
interventions to buy up assets may 
need to be large enough to buy all 
or most of a seller’s assets. Selling 
assets helps the seller raise cash — 
which strengthens his balance sheet. 
However, selling assets also reduces the 
value of the assets that remain on the 
balance sheet — which weakens the 
balance sheet. Buying all of the seller’s 
assets eliminates this second effect.  
Thus, requiring sellers to retain some 
stake in the assets they sell may lead to 
a market freeze.15
Another implication is that 
piecemeal government interventions 
to facilitate asset sales may not be 
feasible.  When potential buyers are 
highly leveraged, they are reluctant to 
buy assets for fear of creating a new 
price that will reduce the value of their 
inventoried assets. The government 
could then unfreeze the market by 
buying the assets, rather than having 
the highly leveraged buyers buy the 
assets. Since the government may 
have less information than the seller, 
it must offer a low enough price so 
that it can break even, on average.16 
However, by creating this lower price, 
the government may harm other 
potential buyers who previously chose 
not to trade, since the new price can 
be used to reevaluate their inventoried 
assets. Alternatively, if the government 
does not want to hurt potential buyers, 
it could offer them a subsidy or could 
increase the price it pays to the seller. 
However, these options impose a cost 
on taxpayers.  
13 This might happen, for example, if the buyer 
already has some assets similar to the one he 
purchases, and if the fact that the seller was 
willing to sell indicates that the value of these 
assets is lower than initially thought.
14 For our results, we do not need to assume 
mark-to-market accounting, where inventoried 
assets are being evaluated “technically” based 
on the price of the last transaction. We could 
assume instead that regulators or potential lend-
ers make inferences from the sale price, just as 
the buyer did in the previous section, and that 
they use these inferences to assess the value of 
inventoried assets.
15 This possibility must be weighed against the 
possible benefits of requiring the seller to retain 
a stake in his own assets.  Such a requirement 
may discourage loan originators from making 
bad loans in the first place. See, for example,  
Senate bill S. 3217 - Restoring American Finan-
cial Stability Act of 2010 (April 15, 2010).
16 This assumes that the government has a 
higher valuation for the asset. Otherwise, the 
government can never break even, on average.Business Review  Q2  2011   17 www.philadelphiafed.org
FEAR OF FIRE SALES CAN LEAD 
TO A MARKET FREEZE
During the recent financial crisis, 
we observed not only a market freeze 
but also a contemporaneous credit 
crunch, during which banks were 
reluctant to make loans. Douglas 
Diamond and Raghuram Rajan suggest 
that both problems may have a com-
mon root: the fear of a fire sale, that 
is, the fear that banks will be forced to 
sell their assets at prices that are well 
below fair values. 
Why Do Fire Sales Occur? 
Suppose a firm runs into liquidity 
problems and needs to raise cash. 
Ideally, the firm would sell its assets 
to the buyer who values them the 
most, such as another firm in the same 
industry. However, this buyer may be 
experiencing financial difficulties at 
the same time as the firm and may be 
unable to raise the money to buy the 
assets at a fair value. The firm may 
then attempt to sell its assets to a firm 
outside its industry, but this other firm 
might place a lower value on the assets. 
For example, if all airlines are losing 
money, an airline that runs into bank-
ruptcy might need to sell its assets to a 
financial firm with an airplane leasing 
subsidiary. This financial firm may 
not value the assets as much because 
it may take time for it to find a lessee 
and put the aircraft in service, espe-
cially during a recession. In this case, 
the sale price might be well below the 
price that firms in the airline industry 
would pay if they had the money.17 
Similarly, when a bank runs into 
financial problems, it may need to 
sell its assets at fire sale prices simply 
because other banks that value its 
assets don’t have enough cash to pay 
fair prices. (Or, alternatively, if there 
is only one bank with cash, that bank 
may use its monopoly power to lower 
its bid.) In our context, different 
valuations may arise because of 
different expertise. For example, some 
financial firms specialize in mortgage-
backed securities (they know how 
to value and how to market these 
securities), while other firms don’t. 
These less knowledgeable firms may 
be willing to buy the assets only if they 
get a large enough discount, which 
may also reflect the fact that they have 
less information about the assets. Note, 
however, that once conditions in the 
financial sector improve and the banks 
that value the assets the most are no 
longer cash constrained, the price of 
the asset is expected to return to its 
fair value.
Viral Acharya, Douglas Gale, and 
Tanju Yorulmazer expand the intuition 
above to explain why a bank may not 
be able to roll over short-term loans, 
even though the bank posts collateral 
whose value is expected to be high 
in the long term. In their paper, the 
problem is that if the bank defaults, 
the lender must sell the collateral in a 
fire sale to another bank, which also 
borrows short term and which can 
also default on its loan. If this second 
bank defaults, its lender must also sell 
the collateral in a fire sale to a third 
bank, which can borrow short term 
and default, and so on. Anticipating 
this, the initial lender may not be 
willing to lend against the full value of 
the collateral. (In the language of the 
finance profession, the initial lender 
may require a large “haircut.”18)  
The Prospect of a Fire Sale May 
Cause a Market Freeze. The prospect 
of a fire sale will be reflected in the 
price today because, instead of buying 
today, a potential buyer can wait and 
buy later. For example, if investors 
think that there is a 50 percent chance 
that the price next month will be $100 
and a 50 percent chance that the price 
will be only $20 (because of a fire sale), 
the most they will be willing to pay 
today is the average price of $60.19 
Douglas Diamond and Raghuram 
Rajan show that the possibility of a 
fire sale can lead to what financial 
economists call “debt overhang” and, 
in turn, a market freeze.  In their 
model, a bank is reluctant to sell its 
assets today, even though this could 
save it from potential bankruptcy in 
the future, because the gains from 
selling at today’s low price are captured 
by the firm’s creditors rather than its 
shareholders. To see that, let’s continue 
with the example above. Suppose 
the bank owes $60 to its creditors, 
to be paid next month. If the bank 
does not have any financial problems, 
During the recent 
                    
                    
                       
                  
                      
                 
                 
       
17 The discussion above is based on the paper 
by Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny. Todd 
Pulvino provides empirical evidence consistent 
with Shleifer and Vishny’s model. Using aircraft 
sale transactions that occurred from 1978 to 
1991, he shows that during a recession, an air-
line that is more financially constrained is more 
likely to sell to a financial institution (rather 
than to another airline) and that financial insti-
tutions pay, on average, 30 percent less than the 
market price.
18 For example, if the face value of a bond used 
as collateral is $100, but the lender is willing to 
lend only $80 against it, we say that the haircut 
is 20 percent.
19 If the investor does not care about risk (that 
is, he is risk neutral) and if the interest rate is 
very low, say 0 percent, the price today will be 
$60. Otherwise, the price will be lower.18   Q2  2011 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
it can sell its asset next month for 
$100, pay its creditors, and distribute 
the rest ($40) to its shareholders. 
However, if the bank runs into a 
financial problem and is forced to 
sell its assets at a price of only $20, it 
cannot fully pay its creditors and its 
shareholders get nothing. On average, 
the bank’s shareholders expect to 
obtain $20 (0.5*40+0.5*0) and the 
bank’s creditors expect to obtain $40 
(0.5*60+0.5*20). Now suppose instead 
that the bank can sell its assets today 
at $60. Then the bank can pay back 
its creditors, but nothing is left for 
its shareholders. Hence, the bank’s 
shareholders will prefer not to sell, 
despite the financial risk. And if the 
bank’s manager acts on behalf of its 
shareholders, he will not sell, and the 
market will freeze.20
The Prospect of a Fire Sale 
Can Also Make Banks Reluctant 
to Lend. Diamond and Rajan’s model 
explains not only a freeze in asset 
markets but also a contemporaneous 
credit freeze, which is consistent with 
what we saw in the recent recession. 
Banks may be induced to hoard cash 
rather than to lend because if there is 
a fire sale, cash on hand could make 
them a fortune, since they would pay 
less for assets than what they are truly 
worth.21 
Diamond and Rajan discuss 
various interventions through which 
the government can reduce the 
prospects of fire sales and unfreeze the 
market. For example, the government 
can induce banks to sell their assets 
by offering to pay more than other 
potential buyers offer. However, as 
in the previous section, this does not 
necessarily imply that the government 
is expected to lose money. In 
particular, if the government can hold 
the assets until the price comes back 
to fair value, the government could 
potentially make money. However, this 
argument ignores the potential costs 
involved in managing those assets. 
CONCLUSION
Economists have suggested a few 
explanations for the recent freeze in 
asset markets, such as: (1) investors 
did not know how to quantify risk; (2) 
asymmetric information has increased; 
(3) banks were concerned about the 
effect of transactions on the value of 
their inventories; or (4) banks did not 
want to sell their assets at low prices 
that reflected the possibility of a future 
fire sale.
While it is unlikely that a single 
model will explain everything — after 
all a model is not reality — each model 
sheds light on some aspect of the crisis. 
For example, one model explains the 
large bid-and-ask spreads and the 
relationship to fair values, another 
explains the increased trade before the 
market froze, and yet another explains 
the contemporaneous freeze in credit 
markets.  
The models also help us think 
about the effects of government in-
terventions. For example, if banks are 
worried about the effects of transac-
tions on their inventoried assets, the 
government may need to buy all or 
most of the assets on the seller’s bal-
ance sheet in order to unfreeze the 
market; however, creating a lower 
market price may impose a cost on 
other market participants. If banks 
are worried about future fire sales, the 
government may help by reducing the 
chance of fire sales, for example, by 
closing weak banks, infusing capital 
into banks that face liquidity problems, 
buying assets, or injecting capital into 
potential buyers.22  B R
20 Note that if the bank’s creditors were in con-
trol, they would decide to sell the asset today. 
The conflict of interest between shareholders 
and creditors (debt holders) described above is 
a common problem in corporate finance. See, 
for example, the well-known paper by Michael 
Jensen and William Meckling and the well-
known paper by Stewart Myers.
21 In a recent working paper, Lucian Bebchuk 
and Itay Goldstein suggest a different explana-
tion for the recent credit freeze. In their paper, 
a bank is reluctant to lend to a firm with a good 
investment opportunity because the bank is 
afraid that other banks won’t lend and the firm 
will fail. In another paper, Ricardo Caballero 
and Arvind Krishnamurthy show that banks 
that are worried about worst-case scenarios 
may hoard liquidity instead of lending to one 
another. 
22 These government interventions are discussed 
in Diamond and Rajan’s paper.Business Review  Q2  2011   19 www.philadelphiafed.org
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